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Abstract Indeterminism, understood as a notion that an event may be continued in
a few alternative ways, invokes the question what a region of chanciness looks like.
We concern ourselves with its topological and spatiotemporal aspects, abstracting
from the nature or mechanism of chancy processes. We first argue that the question
arises in Montague-Lewis-Earman conceptualization of indeterminism as well as in
the branching tradition of Prior, Thomason and Belnap. As the resources of the
former school are not rich enough to study topological issues, we investigate the
question in the framework of branching space-times of Belnap (Synthese
92:385–434, 1992). We introduce a topology on a branching model as well as a
topology on a history in a branching model. We define light-cones and assume four
conditions that guarantee the light-cones so defined behave like light-cones of
physical space-times. From among various topological separation properties that are
relevant to our question, we investigate the Hausdorff property. We prove that each
history in a branching model satisfies the Hausdorff property. As for the satisfaction
of the Hausdorff property in the entire branching model, we prove that it is related to
the phenomenon of passive indeterminism, which we describe in detail.
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Uncontroversially, our world has spatial and temporal aspects, or (as the physics has
it) spatiotemporal aspects. Accordingly, an adequate analysis of (in)determinism of
our world must explain how (in)determinism plays out in space and time (or in a
spacetime). Although the intuitive core of the notion of (in)determinism, i.e., ‘‘the
past does (not) determine uniquely the future’’ is hardly contentious, there are a few
proposals of how to rigorously explain this intuition. Prominent are two approaches
nowadays, that develop, respectively, a Laplacean, physics-inspired, concept and a
notion based on modal intuitions voiced perhaps first in Aristotle’s De Interpre-
tatione. Despite deep philosophical differences (which we will review shortly), the
two approaches face a similar challenge: to explain what a region of indeterminism
looks like. Here is how the question arises. Without making any claim to historical
accuracy, it is good to think of both schools as introducing a concept of a global
course of events, calling it a possible world, possible history, or possible scenario.
To analyze (in)determinism, they next postulate some global directionality, which
needs to be neither temporal, nor linear. As a result, the Laplacean school has a
concept of initial segments of possible worlds, whereas the Aristotelian invokes a
distinction between an event’s past, its future of possibilities, and its wings, that is,
the set of events space-like related to it. To address the question of (in)determinism,
the Laplacean then looks for isomorphic initial segments of a pair of possible
worlds, the later segments of which are not isomorphic. The Aristotelian school asks
if there is some event whose future of possibilities contains more than one
alternative possibility. Accordingly, both the schools legitimize a notion of passing
from the region of determinateness (isomorphic initial segments, or an event’s past
including perhaps its wings) to the region of indeterminacy (one of non-isomorphic
later segments, or one of alternative possible futures of an event). We may thus
consider a path, say a photon’s trajectory, passing from the region of determinate-
ness to the region of indeterminacy. Since a spacetime is typically assumed to be
continuous, the following question arises: What does the path look like at the border
of determinateness and indeterminacy? For instance, is there a last element in the
the determinateness region, or a first element in the indeterminacy region?
The proper tools to handle questions like this belong to topology, and in
particular, to the theory of the so-called separation properties. Our paper focuses
almost entirely on one of these properties, called the Hausdorff property, to be
explained in Sect. 3.1. This property comes to the fore in debates over topological
aspects of indeterminism: Supposing that indeterminism plays out in spacetime,
philosophers and physicists typically ask if the Hausdorff property is satisfied.1 Our
focus on the Hausdorff property has a practical dimension as well: An investigation
of other separation properties would extend the size of this essay beyond any
tolerable limit. Other topological features of indeterminism nevertheless require
study as well. In fact, we hope this essay will serve as a call to further investigate the
1 Recently the philosopher Earman (2008) discussed the Hausdorff property in relation to various ways
of conceptualizing indeterminism. On the role of Hausdorff property in physics we have also been taught
by the physicist A. Staruszkiewicz, whom we gratefully acknowledge.
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issue of what the region of passage from determinateness to indeterminacy looks
like. The phrase ‘‘looks like’’ is to indicate that we are not concerned with the
physics of indeterministic processes, that is, with the question of how indeterminism
occurs. We are concerned solely with a combination of spacetime and modality, and
the topological issues this combination raises.
To handle the topological questions, we need, however, a rigorous theory
combining indeterminism and spacetime. With the exception of Montague’s (1962)
model-theoretic analysis of point mass mechanics and Newtonian gravitation, there
is not enough mathematical rigor in the current developments of Laplacean
(in)determinism to permit a fruitful study of topological issues. The required rigor is
possessed by Belnap’s (1992) axiomatic theory of branching space-times (BST),
which combines (in)determinism with (rudimentary) relativistic spacetimes. More-
over, the BST axioms are frugal, and as far as topological questions are concerned,
BST and the Laplacean approach have some affinity (as we show in Sect. 2). Thus,
although we will carry out our investigations in the BST framework, our findings
have bearing for the Laplacean school as well.
As we said, we will investigate one separation property: the Hausdorff property.
In doing this, we will pursue two quite separate goals. Chiefly we address the
following question: Under what conditions does a BST model of indeterminism
(that is, a model of BST comprising many branching histories) satisfy the Hausdorff
property? Our secondary aim is to address the Earman (2008) argument that ‘‘literal
branching of a relativistic spacetime’’ (p. 193) leads to a failure of the Hausdorff
property.2 The failure of the Hausdorff property has various negative consequences
for physics, which Earman lists. So, in order to avoid these consequences, each
individual spacetime in BST needs to satisfy the Hausdorff property. We thus
investigate whether or not this is so. Intuitively speaking, it is unbelievable that
adding indeterminism should destroy topological properties of a single spacetime
(or history in BST parlance). In our earlier publication (Placek and Belnap 2012) we
stated some theorems (mostly without proof) that supported the unbelievability
intuition. Here we lay down our reasoning in full detail, showing that a single
history satisfies the Hausdorff property, in spite of our BST-style explanation of
indeterminism in terms of branching.
The essay is organized as follows. Section 2 contrasts the two schools of thinking
about (in)determinism, Laplacean and Aristotelian. Section 3 introduces topology
for BST and shows that each BST history satisfies the Hausdorff property. An
important part of this task is the introduction of light-cones into the abstract
framework of BST. Then Sect. 4 proves that each single BST history (aka
spacetime) satisfies the Hausdorff property. Section 5 presents theorems exhibiting
necessary and sufficient conditions for a BST branching-histories model to satisfy
2 The argument does not specify with respect to which topology the Hausdorff property fails; in
particular, it does not relate to the so-called Bartha topology, put forward by Belnap (1992) as a natural
topology for BST. Since one may always produce a Hausdorff topology on a set (e.g., discrete topology)
we read the argument as saying that on every natural topology, a branching relativistic spacetime is non-
Hausdorff. We counter it by showing that such a spacetime is Hausdorff with respect to the natural
topology of BST, the Bartha topology.
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the Hausdorff property. And Sect. 6 lays out arguments that the topologies discussed
in this essay are natural topologies for BST. The essay ends with Conclusions.
2 Two Schools of (in)Determinism
Innocent of the concept of computers or Turing machines, Laplace (1820) had
recourse to a powerful intelligence to explicate a concept of determinism, the
inspiration for which came from Newtonian mechanics. The intelligence is
supposed to have two kinds of data, first about an instantaneous state of a system
and second about a mathematical form of all forces acting in the system. These data
enable the intelligence to have the future as well as the past of the system ‘‘present
before its eyes.’’ One problem with this characterization is that it is stated in
epistemic terms. A natural move of replacing the metaphorical ‘‘present before its
eyes’’ by ‘‘to predict’’ or ‘‘to compute’’ does not change this predicament.
‘‘De-epistemologizing’’ of Laplacean indeterminism was achieved by Montague
(1962), who defined a few versions of Laplacean indeterminism in model-theoretic
terms, and applied these definitions to mass point particle mechanics and Newtonian
gravitation. Montague’s momentous decision was to take (in)determinism to be
ascribable to theories, a move that many philosophers have followed. What the
successors rarely appreciate, however, is that a theory was understood by Montague
in the logical sense, that is, as fully characterized by a (formal) language and a set of
axioms. Thus, to apply Montague’s machinery, one needs first to formulate a given
physical theory in some formal language, and then to select an adequate set of
axioms, that is, a set that would deliver truths and only truths of the physical theory
in question. A verdict of whether a theory is deterministic is then based on the
behavior of models (more precisely, partial models) of the theory. Roughly, a theory
is deterministic iff whenever the initial segments of two of its partial models agree,
the later segments of these models agree as well. If we identify a theory with the
class of its models, we may derivatively say that such a class of models is
deterministic or not. We may further define a model to be deterministic iff it belongs
to a deterministic class of models. But it does not make sense on this approach to
primarily ascribe either determinism or indeterminism to a single model: In a single
model there is no structure capable of representing (in)determinism. The need to
present a living physical theory as a formal language with a set of axioms
(a formidable task indeed) is likely responsible for there being no results (as far as
we know) achieved in Montague’s framework (apart from his own).
Philosophers turned instead to Lewis’s (1983) account, which takes inspiration
from Montague’s analysis,3 but is stated in terms of divergent possible worlds rather
than partial models of a theory, the logical notion of a theory being replaced by a
concept of laws of nature. He calls two worlds ‘‘divergent’’ iff they are not
duplicates but an initial segment of one world and an initial segment of the other are
duplicates (p. 359). Still, on Lewis’s analysis, laws of nature bear a close affinity to
a theory, since they are supposed to belong to all the true deductive systems with a
3 Lewis gives full credit to Montague’s work in this paper.
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best combination of simplicity and strength. (Hence, like a theory, they are
linguistic objects.) Then Lewis’s explication of determinism goes as follows:
First, a system L of laws of nature is Deterministic iff no two divergent worlds
both conform perfectly to the laws of that system. Second, a world is
Deterministic iff its laws comprise a Deterministic system. Third, Determin-
ism is the thesis that our world is Deterministic. (Lewis, 1983, p. 360)
Finally we quote an even more succinct formulation, due to Earman (1986, p. 13). In
contrast to Lewis’s formulation, it requires that two worlds agree at a time rather
than on initial segments.
The world w 2 W is Laplacean deterministic just in case for any w0 2 W , if w
and w0 agree at any time, then they agree for all times.
We now want to contrast Laplacean indeterminism with a modal concept of
indeterminism, the essence of which is alternative possible futures. The milestones
in the development of the modal concept of determinism is Kripke’s letter to Prior
(dated September 3, 1958 and reported by Øhrstrøm and Hasle (1995, p. 173)), and
the following book and papers: Prior (1967), Thomason (1970), and Belnap (1992).
Belnap (1992) characterizes this concept as follows:
Let Our World be the set of point events that are ‘‘in suitable external
relations’’ to us. Accommodate indeterminism by including those point events
that either are now future possibilities or were future possibilities. A point
event, e, is indeterministic if Pe [i.e., the set of possibilities open at e] has
more than one member. Otherwise, it is deterministic. Note that on this
account it makes perfectly good sense to locate indeterminism not metaphor-
ically in a theory, but literally in our world. It makes sense to say that Our
World was indeterministic in Boston yesterday, but might not be so in Austin
tomorrow.4
With this little collection of quotes, we can see the differences between the two
schools, which we organize as below:
External versus internal. The Laplacean school describes (in)determinism from
an external standpoint, in an ‘‘eternal’’ language in which there are no indexicals,
and in particular no tenses. Accordingly, this language does not allow one to draw a
distinction between the possible and the actual, and considers all possibilities to be
on a par. In contrast, the other project uses a language, in which an agent (a speaker)
says things from her particular perspective. The perspective has both spatial and
temporal location, but also a modal aspect, as it reflects what was/is/will be possible
or actual—from a given perspective.
Global versus local. The first approach ascribes (in)determinism to large
structures (like theories or worlds), whereas the other puts indeterminism on point
events, and derivatively, on sets of point events.
4 Pe is defined as the partition of the set HðeÞ of histories containing e that is induced by the relation :e on
HðeÞ, understood as ‘‘two histories are undivided at e’’: h e h0 iff 9eðe 2 h \ h0 ^ e\eÞ. For more
details, see Sect. 3.
On Topological Issues of Indeterminism 407
123
Modally thin versus modally thick. Each single object used in the definition of
Laplacean indeterminism, be it Montague’s partial model, or Earman/Lewis
possible world, has in itself no structure to represent alternative possibilities. Each
such object is, we say, modally thin. One gets (in)determinism by considering a
class of such structures. In contrast, a model of the (axiomatic) BST theory (called
Our World) typically has many structures (called ‘histories’), to represent
alternative possible courses of events of Our World. A BST model is modally thick.
(In)determinism of theories or of a world? As a result of the above, the first
school ascribes (in)determinism to a theory or its class of models, or its laws of
nature. Only derivatively can it ascribe (in)determinism to a single possible world,
by considering it a member of a relevant set of possible worlds. In contrast, BST
begins with defining (in)determinism of point events, and then uses it to define
(in)determinism of a set of point events, or even to draw a distinction between
deterministic versus indeterministic models of BST.
Ensemble branching versus BST branching. Current Laplaceans explicate
(in)determinism in terms of what Earman (2008, p. 188) calls ‘‘ensemble
branching.’’ An ensemble is a collection of models of a given theory, where each
model is a spacetime (typically, a differential manifold plus some extra structure)
and these models are isomorphic at a time. (Isomorphism at issue is understood here
as the existence of appropriate diffeomorphism between the manifolds.) In contrast
to the Laplaceans’ focus on many models (=spacetimes) of a physical theory, a
generic model of the theory of BST contains more than one spacetime (aka possible
history). Spacetimes branch in BST, since they intersect, but, emphatically, there is
no branching within a single spacetime. A single branching spacetime is analyzed
for instance by Penrose (1979) or by McCabe (2005), but BST has nothing to say
about this concept. For more on ensemble branching versus BST, cf. Placek and
Belnap (2012).
The differences run deep.5 For our task of investigating what a region of
indeterminism looks like, however, there is an affinity between the two approaches.
After all, two divergent worlds of Lewis’s are isomorphic over some initial
segments of them, with their larger initial segments being non-isomorphic.
Similarly, two branching histories overlap in some initial region, and then branch
off. We might be able to say more were we given the details of an isomorphism on
initial segments of possible worlds. This matter, however, has not, as far as we
know, been investigated in the Laplacean school. The call for providing some
details about the mentioned isomorphism will be further reinforced by our results of
Sect. 6.3 that show how natural a construction of a branching model (though not
necessarily a BST model) out of a set of divergent worlds is.
The deep differences between the two ways of thinking about indeterminism are
responsible, we believe, for confusedly taking a BST spacetime (history) to be non-
Hausdorff. An attempt to clarify this confusion was made by Placek and Belnap
(2012); we repeat here the main points of their paper. BST branching is neither an
ensemble branching nor a branching within a single spacetime (aka individual
5 For more about the controversy over modal aspects of indeterminism, see Müller (2009) or Placek and
Belnap (2012).
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branching). BST branching relies on a modally thick notion of a theory’s model. In
such a model there are structures (histories or spacetimes) representing alternative
courses of events. Each history/spacetime is modally thin. It does not branch in
itself, that is, in BST we do not have individual branching. Placek and Belnap
(2012) conjectured that in a natural topology for BST, each history/spacetime is
Hausdorff (modulo some physically motivated assumptions); this claim we prove in
Sect. 4. This result answers an objection of non-Hausdorfness of BST spacetimes.6
A separate issue concerns topological properties of a collection of possible
worlds or histories or spacetimes. Note that such a collection is typically needed to
represent indeterminism. In BST a collection of the sort in question is a multi-
history model of the BST theory (with every two histories overlapping). The rigor of
BST permits addressing topological issues related to the whole BST model.
Regarding the Hausdorff property, Placek and Belnap (2012) claimed, and we prove
here, that a multi-history BST model is non-Hausdorff in its natural topology
(modulo some intuitive assumptions). We emphasize that the same topological
issues, including the satisfaction of the Hausdorff property, arise in the Laplacean
tradition. Is an ensemble of spacetimes, as a whole, Hausdorff? More generally,
what topological properties does such an ensemble have? To handle these questions
in the Laplacean tradition requires a clarification about details of constructing an
ensamble, in particular, details concerning isomorphism between segments of
spacetimes, as well as a choice of topology. But, if it turns out that ensembles of
spacetimes are non-Hausdorff, this result in itself will not speak against the
Laplacean (ensemble-style) representation of (in)determinism of spacetime theories.
In a similar vein, non-Hausdorffness of a whole multi-history BST model does not
speak against a branching-style representation of (in)determinism of spacetime
theories.
We thus suspect that there is a different worry lurking behind topological
objections to branching, namely, Is branching capable of representing indetermin-
ism of theories of physics? This problem requires a separate investigation that lies
definitely outside the scope of this study. We nevertheless give here a hint as to why
we are optimistic about application of branching to physics. As Müller (2009)
argues, although the current orthodoxy in philosophical approaches to determinism
is Laplacean, defining (in)determinism of a theory in terms of an ensemble of the
theory’s models, the assessment of a theory’s (in)determinism is not done in terms
of models (these are typically too hard to construct). A diagnosis concerning
(in)determinism is based on the behavior of solutions to a theory’s equations of
evolution. Does a theory admit a unique equation of evolution, given the initial
data? Or perhaps it permits non-unique solutions (for the same initial data) in the
sense that two solutions bifurcate, after being identical for some period of time?
Such non-unique solutions are naturally viewed as branching histories. Needless to
say, to turn this observation into an argument that branching is capable of
representing (in)determinism of theories, we need a workable branching-style
6 Earman (2008) does not necessarily lever this objection against BST. He says, ‘‘Since I have been
unable to get a fix on what Belnap branching involves, all I can say for the present is this: insofar as
Belnap branching eschews individual branching, then for present purposes I have no quarrel with it . . .’’
(p. 192), and, yes, we eschew individual branching.
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definition of (in)determinism of a theory. The task of constructing such a definition
we leave, however, for a future project.
We proceed now to investigate topological questions of indeterminism in the
framework of branching space-times.
3 Topology of BST
‘‘BST’’ stands for the theory of branching space-times as introduced in Belnap
(1992) and developed by several hands, as indicated in the References.
A model of BST is defined as a dense partial order OW ¼ hW ; i without
maxima that satisfies two simple conditions, conditions that are more transparent if we
use the following definition: A history in OW is a maximal (upward) directed set; we use
h for histories. h1?eh2 iff e is a ‘‘choice point’’ for h1 and h2, that is, iff e is a maximum
of h1 \ h2. (1) Every lower bounded chain has an infimum, and every upper bounded
chain has a supremum in every history that contains it; and (2) (prior choice postulate)
where h1, h2 are histories in OW, let E be a chain in h1nh2. Then 9 eðe \ E and
h1?eh2Þ.7 Later we will indicate some illuminating conditions that can be added to
BST in order to make full contact with certain topological questions.
In addition to ‘‘history’’ and ‘‘choice point,’’ the following defined terms prove
invaluable in articulating the properties of BST.
Definition 1 (Histories) Hist is the set of all histories in OW. HðeÞ ¼ fh 2 Histje 2
hg is the set of histories containing e.
h e h0 (read as ‘‘histories h and h0 are undivided at e’’) iff 9e0ðe\e0 ^ e0 2
h \ h0Þ. (Note that h e h0 is provably an equivalence relation on HðeÞ.)
h ?e h0 (read as ‘‘h and h0 divide (or split) at e’’) iff e is a maximum in h \ h0.
Two events e1; e2 2 W are space-like related, e1 SLR e2, iff they are
incomparable and there is a history to which the two belong.
3.1 BST: The Diamond Topology
In this section we will introduce a topology for BST in order to investigate in the
next sections whether the Hausdorff property is satisfied in BST histories and in
BST models. Let us first recall the Hausdorff property:
Definition 2 Suppose that T is a topology on set X. Then T has the Hausdorff
property iff for any two distinct e; e0 2 X there are disjoint sets U;V 2 T such that
e 2 U and e0 2 V .
We introduce now, following Bartha, what we claim to be a thoroughly natural
topology for BST.8 (See Sect. 6 for arguments for the naturalness.)
7 In considering probabilities in BST, Weiner and Belnap (2006) recorded a need (discovered by Weiner)
for a further natural postulate. It plays no role, however, in our current investigation.
8 Cf. Belnap (2003a), note 26.
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Definition 3 (diamonds) Let OW ¼ hW ;6i be a BST model. We define
de1e2 :¼ fy 2 W je1\e2 ^ e1 6 y 6 e2g;
which we call ‘‘the diamond with vertices e1 and e2.’’
Further, if want to stress that vertices e1, e2 belong to a certain maximal chain t in
W (t 2 MCðWÞ), we will write de1e2t ð¼ de1e2Þ, calling it ‘‘the diamond oriented by t
with vertices e1 and e2.’’
The ‘diamond’ terminology reflects the fact that the above condition, if applied to
R
2 ordered by the Minkowskian ordering, yields diamond-like shapes.9
Definition 4 (the diamond topology on W) Z is an open subset of W , Z 2 TðWÞ, iff
Z = W or for every e 2 Z and for every t 2 MCðWÞ containing e there is a diamond
de1e2t  Z that is oriented by t with e strictly between the diamond’s vertices e1 and
e2.
Thus, Z 2 TðWÞ iff Z = W or
8e 2 Z 8t 2 MCðWÞðe 2 t! 9e1; e2 2 tðe1\e\e2 ^ de1e2t  ZÞÞ:
The condition of the above definition can be used to define the topology TðhÞ on
history h 2 Hist as well:
Definition 5 (the diamond topology on a single history) Z 2 TðhÞ iff Z = h or
8e 2 Z 8t 2 MCðhÞðe 2 t! 9e1; e2 2 tðe1\e\e2 ^ de1e2t  ZÞÞ;
where MC(h) denotes the set of maximal chains in h.
Despite apparent similarity, the two topologies are different, as evidenced by this
fact:10
Fact 6 If Z  h for some history h  W contains a choice point for h and some h0,
then Z 62 TðWÞ. However, Z may belong to TðhÞ.
Proof Let Z  h and c 2 h be a choice point for h and h0 and c 2 Z. There is thus
t 2 MCðWÞ such that c 2 t and 8eðe 2 t ^ c\e! e 62 hÞ. Accordingly, there are
no e1; e2 2 t such that e1 \ c \ e2 and de1e2t  h. Hence for these t and c, there are
no e1; e2 2 t such that e1 \ c \ e2 and de1e2t  Z, which shows that Z 62 TðWÞ. h
It follows that if W is a multi-history model, its histories are not open in the
topology TðWÞ. On the other hand, TðWÞ is ‘‘coherent’’ with the family of
topologies TðhÞ:11
9 The Minkowskian ordering 6M on R
nþ1 (n > 1) is defined as x 6M y iff x0 6 y0 andP
16k6nðxk  ykÞ
2
6 ðx0  y0Þ2, where x ¼ ðx0; x1; . . .; xnÞ; y ¼ ðy0; y1; . . .; ynÞ, and the first coordinates
are temporal.
10 In fact, the topologies are different in a more significant manner than Fact 6 attests; namely, TðhÞ may
even be properly finer than the subspace of TðWÞ on h. In other words, some Z 2 TðhÞ may not only fail
to be in TðWÞ itself, but also fail to have any Z0 2 TðWÞ such that Z0 \ h = Z. We nonetheless omit a
proof of this fact since it is less relevant than Fact 6 to the purpose of this article.
11 See, e.g., Willard (1970, pp. 68f.), for coherent topologies.
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Theorem 7 A 2 TðWÞ iff 8h 2 Hist A \ h 2 TðhÞ.
Proof To the right: Note that if A \ h ¼£, then A \ h 2 TðhÞ. Pick thus an arbitrary
h 2 Hist such that A \ h 6¼£. Pick then an arbitrary e 2 A \ h and an arbitrary (i) t 2
MCðhÞ such that e 2 t. Since MCðhÞ  MCðWÞ and A 2 TðWÞ, there are (ii) e1; e2 2 t
such that (iii) de1e2t  A. Then e2 2 h (by (i) and (ii)). Since histories are downward
closed and de1e2t 6 e2; d
e1e2
t  h. Together with (iii) this implies de1e2t  A \ h.
To the left: Choose an arbitrary e 2 A. We need to show that for an arbitrary
t 2 MCðWÞ such that e 2 t there is a diamond de1e2t  A. By the definition of histories,
for every t 2 MCðWÞ there is some history h such that t  h, so t 2 MCðhÞ. Clearly,
e 2 A \ h and (by the premise) A \ h 2 TðhÞ. It follows (since t 2 MCðhÞ) that there
are e1; e2 2 t such that e1 \ e \ e2 and de1e2t  A \ h, and hence de1e2t  A. h
A significant consequence of this theorem will be discussed extensively in Sect.
6.3.
We need to check that indeed the families TðWÞ and TðhÞ of open sets, as
defined above, form topologies. This means, in the case of TðhÞ, that
£ 2 TðhÞ; h 2 TðhÞ, if U;V 2 TðhÞ then U \W 2 TðhÞ, and the union of every
family of sets from TðhÞ belongs to TðhÞ. It is straightforward to see that the first
two conditions are satisfied, whereas the facts below show that the remaining
conditions are satisfied as well.
Fact 8 For any history h, if U;V 2 TðhÞ, then U \ V 2 TðhÞ.
Proof Suppose U;V 2 TðhÞ. If U = h then U \ V ¼ V 2 TðhÞ; similarly if
V = h. So suppose U = h and V = h. We need to prove that
8e 2 U \ V 8 t 2 MCðhÞðe 2 t! 9e1; e2 2 tðe1\e\e2 ^ de1e2t  U \ VÞÞ.
To this end pick an arbitrary t 2 MCðhÞ that passes through e. Since each of
U, V = h is open, there are diamonds da1a2t  U and db1b2t  V , with a1 \ e \ a2
and b1 \ e \ b2. Put e1 :¼ maxfa1; b1g 2 t and e2 :¼ minfa2; b2g 2 t. Clearly,
e1 \ e \ e2. Since d
e1e2
t  da1a2t  U and de1e2t  db1b2t  V , de1e2t  U \ V . h
Fact 9 For any history h, if Va 2 TðhÞ for every a 2 I,
S
a2I Va 2 TðhÞ.
Proof Suppose the antecedent. If Va = h for some a 2 I then
S
a2I Va ¼ h 2 TðhÞ.










Pick an arbitrary e 2
S
Va; then for some b 2 I, e 2 Vb. Since Vb = h is open,
for every t 2 MCðhÞ such that e 2 t there is a diamond, de1e2t  Vb, with e1; e2 2 t





We thus proved that TðhÞ is a topology on h. Although the fact that TðWÞ is a
topology on W can be analogously shown by a minor tinkering in the proofs above,
it also follows from the fact that TðhÞ are all topologies, since Theorem 7 guarantees
that Facts 8 and 9 imply their TðWÞ versions:
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Fact 10 If U;V 2 TðWÞ, then U \ V 2 TðWÞ.
Proof For each h 2 Hist, if U \ h;V \ h 2 TðhÞ then ðU \ VÞ \ h 2 TðhÞ. h
Fact 11 If Va 2 TðWÞ for every a 2 I;
S
a2I Va 2 TðWÞ.





a2IðVa \ hÞ 2 TðhÞ. h
In what follows, we need a set of particularly simple open subsets of TðhÞ (which
may not be open subsets of TðWÞ), to be thought of as borderless diamonds
(Definition 23 below). To this end, we first need to introduce BST light-cones.
3.2 Light-Cones in BST
To get a better grip on the diamond topology, we would like to single out some
particularly simple open subsets; ideally these subsets should form a base for the
diamond topology on a history. Given that topology, a natural candidate for these
subsets is borderless diamonds. A borderless diamond is a diamond from which the
surface of the future light-cone of its bottom vertex and the surface of the backward
light-cone of its top vertex have been removed. Accordingly, to define borderless
diamonds, we need to introduce light-cones to BST. This task leads to parallel
developments. On the one hand, we will define light-cones in BST and assume some
conditions to guarantee that they behave at least somewhat like light-cones of
spacetimes of physics. (With reference to Fig. 1, this is illustrated in items (i)–(v).)
On the other hand, these conditions are shown to play a topological role, entailing
ultimately that borderless diamonds indeed form a base for the topology TðhÞ.
As a warm-up, let us look at some particular segments of maximal chains asking
whether they are nonempty and lower bounded. Consider first t>e1 :¼ fx 2 tje1 6 xg,
where t 2 MCðhÞ; e1 2 h, and assume it is not empty. Then, since t>e1 is lower
bounded by e1, it has an infimum. Consider next t
6e1 :¼ fx 2 tjx 6 e1g, where t 2
Fig. 1 Visualization of light-cones and their properties C1–C4
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MCðhÞ; e1 2 h and assume it is not empty. Since clearly t6e1 is upper bounded by e1, it
has a history-relative supremum suph ðt6e1Þ.
Definition 12 (light-cones) Let e1; e2 2 h for some history h  W . We say that e2
lies on the forward light-cone of e1 in history h, e2 2 flchðe1Þ, iff
9t 2 MCðhÞðe2 2 t ^ e2 ¼ infðt>e1ÞÞ.
And e1 lies on the backward light-cone of e2 in history h, e1 2 blchðe2Þ, iff
9t 2 MCðhÞðe1 2 t ^ e1 ¼ suphðt6e2ÞÞ.
Note that by this definition e lies both on the backward light-cone as well as on
the forward light-cone of itself. Some further properties of the light-cones are
expressed in the following Fact:
Fact 13 (about light-cones) (1) If e2 2 flchðe1Þ, then e1 6 e2; and (2) if
e1 2 blchðe2Þ, then e1 6 e2.
Proof (1) From the antecedent, 9t 2 MCðhÞ ðe2 ¼ inf ðt>e1ÞÞ. Also, e1 6 t>e1
follows. Since e1 is the chain’s lower bound, we obtain e1 6 inf ðt>e1Þ ¼ e2. The
argument for (2) is analogous. h
With our definitions of lying on a light-cone, we can accommodate one of two
orderings that are typically extracted from the structure of a relativistic spacetime.
They are called J and I orderings—cf. Wald (1984). To put it simply, y is J-above
x iff y is within and including the surface of the future light-cone of x. Hence, an
event on the surface of the future light-cone of x is above x. In contrast, y is I-above
x iff y is within but excluding the surface of the future light-cone of x. Accordingly,
an event on the surface of the future light-cone of x is not above x. Since by Fact 13
(1–2), (the surface of) the future light-cone of e is above e, and (the surface of) the
backward light-cone of e is below e, with our definitions of blc and flc, the BST
ordering is J, not I ordering.
It is still instructive to see why Minkowski space-time with I-ordering does not
yield a BST model. Consider Rn with Minkowskian I-ordering 6IM resulting from its
irreflexive companion relation \M
I , the latter being defined as:12




ðxi  yiÞ2: ð1Þ
Pick a vertical chain C ¼ fðz0; 0; 0; 0Þj0\z0g approaching O = (0, 0, 0, 0) from





0. But O is not an infimum of C because it is not (weakly) above lower





i ¼ x20). Furthermore, by applying density of Rn, it is easy to note that no
other element of Rn is an infimum of C. Thus, hRn;6IMi is not a BST model.
It turns out that for interesting topological results in branching spacetimes, one
must add to the postulates of BST a group of four properties, C1, C2, C3, and C4, to
be satisfied by each history of a BST model. With the help of (i)–(v) below, look at
12 That is, x6IMy iff x\
I
M y _ x ¼ y.
414 T. Placek et al.
123
Fig. 1’s annotated picture of light-cones in R2. One can hardly help ‘‘seeing’’ that
the natural properties C1–C4 of light-cones in Minkowski spacetimes (defined as
Conditions 13, 15, 16, and 17 below) can be expressed in the order-theoretic
vocabulary of BST.
(i) Visual verification of the propriety of Definition 12 of BST light-cones:
9t1 2 MCðR2Þðe5 ¼ infðt>e11 Þ iff e5 2 flchðe1ÞÞ
9t1 2 MCðR2Þðe4 ¼ supR2ðt
6e1
1 Þ iff e4 2 blchðe1ÞÞ
(ii) Reciprocity of flc and blc (implied by C1):
e2 2 flchðe1Þ iff e1 2 blchðe2Þ
(iii) Betweenness (C2):
if e2 2 flchðe1Þ ^ e1\e3\e2 then e3 2 flchðe1Þ \ blchðe2Þ
(iv) Interior of light-cones (C3):
9t0 2 MCðR2Þðe1 2 t0 ^ t0 \ ðflchðe1Þ [ blchðe1ÞÞ ¼£Þ
(v) Limits of light-cones (C4):
A limit of a chain lying on a light-cone lies on the light-cone as well (if it
exists).
Coming on top of Definition 12, the properties C1–C4 form a set that gives us the
minimum wherewithal for making a useful connection between the order-based
theory BST on the one hand, and standard Minkowski theory on the other. We shall
be introducing them one by one, and sometimes considering them separately in
order to tease out their several consequences; one should bear in mind, however,
that they form a package. We motivate them individually by indicating what ‘‘goes
wrong’’ in the absence of each.
Observe first the following odd fact:
Fact 14 In general, it is not true that e2 2 flchðe1Þ iff e1 2 blchðe2Þ.
Proof See Fig. 2. h
The gerrymandered history of Fig. 2 suggests that there is not enough space in it:
There are no events SLR to e1 that are immediately to the right of e1. The two
conditions below are to ensure that there is always enough space in every history:
Condition 15 (C1: enough space) Let h be a history. Then:
8e1; e2 2 hðif e2 2 flchðe1Þ; then 9t 2 MCðhÞðe1 2 t ^ suphðt6e2Þ ¼ e1ÞÞ;
8e1; e2 2 hðif e1 2 blchðe2Þ; then 9t 2 MCðhÞðe2 2 t ^ infðt>e1Þ ¼ e2ÞÞ:
To see that the infima and suprema occurring in this condition exist, note that
since e2 2 flchðe1Þ implies e1 6 e2; t6e2 is nonempty; it is also upper bounded by e2,
so it has history-relative suprema. By a similar argument, t>e1 has an infimum.
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Lemma 16 (Reciprocity) Let a history h satisfy condition C1 of enough space.
Then e2 2 flchðe1Þ iff e1 2 blchðe2Þ.
Proof Assume the LHS of the equivalence. This implies (by the first part of C1)
that there is t 2 MCðhÞ such that e1 2 t ^ suphðt6e2Þ ¼ e1. By Definition 12,
e1 2 blchðe2Þ.
In the opposite direction, e1 2 blchðe2Þ implies, by the second part of C1, that
there is a t0 2 MCðhÞ such that e2 2 t0 and e2 ¼ infðt0>e1Þ. (Definition 12 then
assures us that e2 2 flchðe1Þ.) h
An acquaintance with Minkowski spacetime suggests another requirement on
light-cones, which we may call a betweenness property:
Condition 17 (C2: betweenness property) Let h be a history and x; e 2 h.
Then: If x 2 blchðeÞ, then 8yðx\y\e! y 2 blchðeÞÞ.
And, if e 2 flchðxÞ, then 8yðx\y\e! y 2 flchðxÞÞ.
Condition C2 entails that if x 2 blchðeÞ and y 2 blchðeÞ, then for every z between
x and y; z 2 blchðeÞ. Clearly, if z = x or z = y, or z = e, then z 2 blchðeÞ. If neither
of the above, since by Fact 13 we have y 6 e, hence x \ z \ e, so by
C2 : z 2 blchðeÞ. An analogous property holds for flch.
Condition C2 is independent of the BST axioms, which is shown by the BST
model exhibited in Fig. 3. Every maximal path such as t0 that passes through y has a
segment above y that is below e, which proves that y 62 blchðeÞ. On the other hand,
path t passing through x guarantees that x 2 blchðeÞ.
The BST axioms together with conditions C1 and C2 do not guarantee that there
are maximal chains passing through an event that go only through the ‘‘interior’’ of
the event’s light-cones. To illustrate, Fig. 2 shows a one-history BST model, which
is the R2 plane, with the shaded area on the right removed. (The borders, however,
are in the history.) The ordering is Minkowskian. In this model every maximal chain
e1
e2
Fig. 2 This pathological one-history BST model is a part of the plane to the left of the barred area (the
heavy line is included in the history). e2 lies on the forward light-cone of e1, but e1 does not lie on the
backward light-cone of e2
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passing through e1 stays for some time on the surface of the future light-cone of e1.
Condition C3 below prohibits such models.
Condition 18 (C3: interior of light-cones) Let h 2 Hist. Then
8e 2 h9t 2 MCðhÞðe 2 t ^ t\e 6¼£ ^ t\e \ blchðeÞ ¼£ ^ t [ e \ flchðeÞ ¼£Þ:
Note that we need the condition ‘‘t\e 6¼£’’ above since our history might have
minimal elements; by the BST axiom of no terminal elements, however, we do not
need an analogous condition on t[e.
The final condition here considered concerns suprema (infima) of upper (lower)
bounded chains in future (backward) light-cones: Such suprema (infima) should
belong to future (backward) light-cones.
Condition 19 (C4: limits in light-cones) For every upper bounded chain C 
flchðeÞ; where h 2 Hist and e 2 W: suph ðCÞ 2 flchðeÞ, and for every lower bounded
chain C  blchðeÞ, where h 2 Hist and e 2 W: inf ðCÞ 2 blchðeÞ.
It is no surprise that the conditions C1–C4 still permit strange or pathological
BST models, such as a real half-plane above (and including) the diagonal x = y,
with Minkowskian ordering (this is a one-history model). We say that such histories
have brims. We do not in this paper attempt to give a condition prohibiting brims.
But we aim to give a definition of brims, and put a simple fact relating brims and
light-cones. We distinguish two varieties of a history’s brim, lower and upper. The
intuition underlying our definition is this: If an event e lies on the upper (lower)
brim, every maximal chain passing through e has to go along the same path above
(below) e—the brim—for some period of time.
Definition 20 (brims) e lies on an upper brim of history h, e 2 ubh, iff






Fig. 3 A pathological one-history BST model, the ordered elements being linked by a line, with the
convention that point x not higher on a line than point y means x O y
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brim of history h, e 2 lbh, iff 9y ðy\e ^ 8 t 2 MCðhÞðe 2 t! 8 xðy 6 x 6
e! x 2 tÞÞÞ.
Fact 21 (about brims) For e; e2 2 h, if e 2 ubh and e \ e2, then e 62 blchðe2Þ. Also,
for e; e1 2 h, if e 2 lbh and e1 \ e, then e 62 flchðe1Þ.
Proof For the first assertion, let e, e2 be as in the premise and assume for reductio that
e 2 blchðe2Þ, which entails that for some t 2 MCðhÞ, e 2 t and () e ¼ suphðt6e2Þ. On
the other hand, e 2 ubh means that there is a y such that e \ y and
8t0ðe 2 t0 ! 8 xðe 6 x 6 y! x 2 t0ÞÞ. Hence y 2 t and also y, e, e2 are comparable.
If e\y 6 e2, then e 6¼ suphðt6e2Þ, contradicting (). On the other hand, if e \ y and
e2 \ y, then e2 2 t, and hence suphðt6e2Þ ¼ e2, again contradicting (), since e \ e2 by
the assumption. The second assertion is proved analogously. h
Note that the proof above does not appeal to any of the conditions C1–C4, which
makes one wonder how the existence of brims is related to condition C3. After all,
C3 prohibits that every path going through event e cross the surface of the future
(past) light-cone of e, whereas a brim like diagonal x = y seems to allow for exactly
this. That is, we are tempted to read an event e2 located on the brim and above e as
belonging to the future light-cone of e. The fact above orders us to resist this
temptation, as such an e2 does not belong to flch(e).
As the final topic related to light-cones, we next prove that although by Definition
12 the relations of belonging to a future light-cone and of belonging to a backward
light-cone appear to depend on the history h, in fact each is history-independent.
Fact 22 (History-independence) (1) If e2 2 flchðe1Þ, then for all h0 2 Hist
containing e1 and e2, e2 2 flch0 ðe1Þ.
(2) If e1 2 blchðe2Þ, then for all h0 2 Hist containing e1 and e2, e1 2 blch0 ðe2Þ.
Proof Ad 1. For some t 2 MCðhÞ: () e2 ¼ inf ðt>e1Þ. Pick an arbitrary h0 2 Hist
such that e1; e2 2 h0. There is thus t0 2 MCðh0Þ such that e2 2 t0 and t6e2 ¼ t06e2 . If
z 2 t0 and z \ e2, then z 2 t, and by () z 6> e1, whence z 62 t0>e1 . By contraposition,
if z 2 t0>e1 , then z 6\e2, and hence e2 6 z, so e2 lower bounds t0>e1 . Since e2 2 t0>e1
(by Fact 13 e1 6 e2), we get e2 ¼ inf ðt0>e1Þ and hence e2 2 flch0 ðe1Þ.
Ad 2. Assume that e1 2 blchðe2Þ; hence e1 ¼ suphðt6e2Þ for some t 2 MCðhÞ. By
Fact 13, e1 6 e2. If e1 = e2, then e1 2 blch0 ðe2Þ because every event lies on its own
backward light-cone (in every history containing it). Suppose instead that e1 \ e2. We
claim (y) t [ e1 \ h0 6¼£. Suppose otherwise; then t [ e1  hnh0. So by PCP there is
some c such that c\t [ e1 and h ?c h0; but c\t [ e1 implies c 6 inf ðt [ e1Þ ¼ e1\e2 2
h \ h0, contradicting h ?c h0. Thus (y). Therefore there are z 2 t [ e1 \ h0 and t0 2
MCðh0Þ such that t6z ¼ t06z. Note that e1 2 t6z ¼ t06z and so e1 2 t06e2 . We then
claim (z) t06e2 6 e1. Fix any x 2 t06e2 . If z \ x then z \ e2 and so z 2 t6e2 , which
implies z 6 suphðt6e2Þ ¼ e1, contradicting z 2 t [ e1 ; thus z 6\x, and x 6 z since
z; x 2 t0. Hence x 2 t06z ¼ t6z, while x 2 t06e2 ; so x 2 t6e2 and hence x 6
suphðt6e2Þ ¼ e1. Therefore (z), and so e1 2 t06e2 is the largest element of t06e2 , which
implies e1 ¼ suph0 ðt06e2Þ since e1 2 h0. Thus e1 2 blch0 ðe2Þ. h
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To summarize this section, the axioms of BST were intended only to characterize
indeterminism in the sense of allowing events that admit multiple possible historical
continuations. As such, they tell us little about individual histories. In particular, the
axioms alone do not impose the structure of light-cones on a BST history. In
contrast, the conditions C1–C4 concern individual histories and ensure that
flch(e) and blch(e) of Definition 12 behave like future light-cones and backward
light-cones of a physical spacetime. Further, flch(e) and blch(e) are history-
independent. This means that our definitions properly generalize the concept of
light-cones from a non-modal context of single space-time (history) to the modal
context of branching possible histories.
In the sections to follow we will put the four conditions to topological work. In
Theorem 35, we will see that these conditions suffice for establishing that each
single history has the Hausdorff property, given the topology, TðhÞ, per Definition
5. Furthermore, Theorems 44 and 47 link the satisfaction of the Hausdorff property
in a many-history BST model with the conditions as well as with passive
indeterminism (cf. Definition 39).
3.3 Borderless Diamonds
We are about to introduce borderless diamonds, and prove that such objects are
open sets of h in the topology TðhÞ. (In general, they are not open sets in the
topology TðWÞ—cf. Fact 6.) We will prove that if a history h satisfies the conditions
C1–C4 of Sect. 3.2, the set of borderless diamonds of h forms a base for topology
TðhÞ. But first the definition:
Definition 23 (borderless diamonds) bde1e2  h is a borderless diamond in history
h, bde1e2 2 BDh, iff there is a diamond de1e2  h such that bde1e2 ¼ de1e2nðblchðe2Þ
[ flchðe1ÞÞ.
If we want to stress that vertices e1, e2 belong to a certain maximal chain t in h,
we will write bde1e2t ð¼ bde1e2Þ.
Borderless diamonds are open subsets of histories that contain them, which
follows from Lemmas 24 and 25 below. They involve 5ðxÞ and 4ðxÞ, that is, the
future and past (without brims) of x.
Lemma 24 For any x 2 W , let
5ðxÞ :¼ fz 2 W jz [ x ^ z 62 flchðxÞg:
If history h satisfies conditions C2 and C4, then 5ðxÞ \ h 2 TðhÞ.
Proof If x 62 h then 5ðxÞ \ h ¼£ 2 TðhÞ; so let us assume x 2 h. Let us pick an
arbitrary e 2 5ðxÞ \ h and some t 2 MCðhÞ such that e 2 t. We need to produce an
oriented diamond d
xy
t  5ðxÞ \ h such that e 2 dx
y
t . To find a bottom vertex x
,
consider t>x \ flchðxÞ. Observe first that inf ðt>xÞ is well-defined since e 2 t>x and
x 6 t>x. Since inf ðt>xÞ > x and inf ðt>xÞ 2 flchðxÞ, t>x \ flchðxÞ is non-empty. It is
also upper bounded by e since e is comparable with every z 2 t>x \ flchðxÞ and
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e \ z contradicts C2, as z 2 flchðxÞ but e 62 flchðxÞ. Accordingly t>x \ flchðxÞ has a
supremum-in-h, s ¼ suph ðt>x \ flchðxÞÞ, and s 2 t. By C4, s 2 flchðxÞ. Moreover,
s \ e; otherwise e 2 flchðxÞ, which is prohibited by the second conjunct of the
definition of 5ðxÞ. By density, we pick some x 2 t>x such that s \ x\ e: Hence
x 62 flchðxÞ. Moreover, for every z 2 h, if z > x, then z [ x and z 62 flchðxÞ (by C2),
so z 2 5ðxÞ. Accordingly, for every y 2 t [ e  h, dx
y
t  5ðxÞ \ h. h
Lemma 25 For any x 2 W , let
4ðxÞ :¼ fz 2 W jz\x ^ z 62 blchðxÞ ^ z is not minimal in Wg:
If history h satisfies conditions C2 and C4 and moreover x 2 h (which implies
4ðxÞ  h and 4ðxÞ \ h ¼ 4ðxÞ), then 4ðxÞ 2 TðhÞ.
Proof We proceed similarly to the proof for Lemma 24, picking an arbitrary
e 2 4ðyÞ and some t 2 MCðhÞ, e 2 t, and then looking for dx
y
t , with e 2 dx
y
t , this
time concentrating on its top vertex y 2 t6y. We consider t6y \ blchðyÞ. Note that
suph ðt6yÞ is well-defined since e 2 t6y and y > t6y. Since suph ðt6yÞ 6 y and
suph ðt6yÞ 2 blchðyÞ, t6y \ blchðyÞ is non-empty; it is also lower bounded by e since
for every z 2 t6y \ blchðyÞ, e and z are comparable, and z \ e contradicts C2.
Accordingly there is an infimum f ¼ inf ðt6y \ blchðyÞÞ and f 2 t. By C4,
f 2 blchðyÞ. Moreover, e \ f; otherwise e 2 blchðyÞ. By density, there is some y 2
t6y such that e \ y* \ f. Hence y 62 blchðyÞ. Moreover, for every z 2 h, if z 6 y,
then z \ y and z 62 blchðyÞ (by C2), so z 2 4ðyÞ. Thus, for every x 2 t\e that is not
minimal in W (which exists since e 2 4ðyÞ is not minimal in W), dx
y
t  4ðyÞ. h
Note that4ðxÞ is simply fz 2 W jz\x ^ z 62 blchðxÞg if W satisfies C3 (or, in fact,
if W has no minimal elements).
Lemma 26 Let history h satisfy conditions C2 and C4. Then the borderless
diamonds on h are open sets of h, that is, BDh  TðhÞ.
Proof Fix any bdxy 2 BDh. No e 2 bdxy is minimal in W since x \ bdxy. So,
because bdxy  h, it is the intersection of 5ðxÞ \ h and 4ðyÞ, both of which are in
TðhÞ by Lemmas 24 and 25. Hence bdxy 2 TðhÞ. h
We have learned from Lemma 26 that borderless diamonds are particularly
simple open sets of history h. Do they form a base for topology TðhÞ? The following
lemma suffices.
Lemma 27 Let a history h satisfy conditions C1 and C3 and let A 2 TðhÞ. Then
for every e 2 A, some borderless diamond contained in A contains e.
Proof By C3 there is t 2 MCðhÞ such that both t\e and t[e are nonempty and
t\e \ blchðeÞ ¼£ and t [ e \ flchðeÞ ¼£. If A = h, pick any e1 2 t\e, e2 2 t [ e
and then e 2 de1;e2t  h ¼ A; on the other hand, if A = h, then the openness of A
implies that there are e1 2 t\e and e2 2 t [ e such that e 2 de1;e2t  A. It follows that
e1 62 blchðeÞ and e2 62 flchðeÞ, and hence e 62 ðflchðe1Þ [ blchðe2ÞÞ (by C1). Accord-
ingly, e is not on a border of de1e2t , so e 2 bde1e2  A. h
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Theorem 28 Let h 2 Hist satisfy conditions C1, C2, C3, and C4. Then the set BDh
of borderless diamonds on h forms a base for the topology TðhÞ, that is





Proof By Lemma 26, conditions C2 and C4 guarantee that borderless diamonds
are open subsets of h. To construct B  BDh that has the above property, let us put
B :¼ fbd 2 BDhjbd  Ag. To prove that
S
B  A, pick bd 2 B. Then by the
definition of B, bd  A. Lemma 27, which requires C1 and C3, gives us the opposite
direction. h
Theorem 28 also means that if a history h satisfies conditions C1 through C4, the
set of 5ðxÞ \ h and 4ðyÞ (for x; y 2 h) forms a subbase for TðhÞ. It is also worth
noting that Lemma 24 has the following corollary.
Corollary 29 5ðxÞ 2 TðWÞ if W satisfies conditions C2 and C4.
Proof From Lemma 24 by Theorem 7. h
We should note that, in contrast, Lemma 25 (which needs the assumption that
x 2 h) fails to entail the 4ðxÞ counterpart of this corollary, in particular, by Fact 6,
when 4ðxÞ contains a choice point.
4 Hausdorff Property on a Single Spacetime (History)
We next have a theorem relevant to the critical question whether a single spacetime
(BST history) has the Hausdorff property. We prove the theorem with two little
lemmas in addition to Lemma 24. The chief idea is to separate two distinct points
into 5ðxÞ and ðxÞ, the regions inside and outside the forward light-cone of some
point x, which is possible due to Fact 33.
Fact 30 For any e1; e2 2 W and t 2 MCðWÞ with e2 2 t, if e1 6 e2 then e1 6 x for
some x 2 t2 [ e2 .
Proof If e1 6 x for all x 2 t2 [ e2 , then e1 6 infðt2 [ e2Þ ¼ e2. h
Lemma 31 For any x 2 W, let
x e W x e e is not minimal in W
Then ðxÞ \ h 2 TðhÞ for any history h.
Proof Fix any e 2 ðxÞ
T
h and t 2 MCðhÞ such that e 2 t. Then Fact 30 implies
x 6 y for some y 2 t [ e; moreover, x 6 z 2 h for any z 6 y (since y 2 t  h).
Therefore, for any z 2 t\e that is not minimal in W (which exists since e is not
minimal in W), we have z \ e \ y and dzy  ðxÞ
T
h. h
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Note that ðxÞ is simply fz 2 W jz 6> xg if W satisfies C3 (or, in fact, if W has no
minimal elements). Note also that, like Corollary 29, Lemma 31 gives an open set of
W:
Corollary 32 ðxÞ 2 TðWÞ.
Proof From Lemma 31 by Theorem 7. h
The following fact is a crucial element for the Hausdorff property of a history. It
is symmetrical to Fact 30 within a history but, unlike Fact 30, does not extend to
Our World (without a pathological assumption).
Fact 33 For any history h, e1; e2 2 h, and t 2 MCðhÞ with e1 2 t and t\e1 6¼£, if
e1 6 e2 then x 6 e2 for some x 2 t\e1 .
Proof If x 6 e2 for all x 2 t\e1 , then e1 ¼ suphðt\e1Þ 6 e2. h
Lemma 34 Suppose that a history h satisfies C3 and that e1 6 e2 for e1; e2 2 h.
Then there is some x 2 h such that x 2 4ðe1Þ (which implies e1 2 5ðxÞ if h satisfies
C1) and e2 2 ðxÞ.
Proof Applying C3, pick t 2 MCðhÞ such that e1 2 t and t\e1 6¼£ but
t\e1 \ blchðe1Þ ¼£. Then by Fact 33 there is x 2 t\e1 such that x 6 e2, that is,
e2 2 ðxÞ, and moreover x 2 4ðe1Þ since t\e1 \ blchðe1Þ ¼£. h
Theorem 35 Let history h of a BST model OW satisfy conditions C1, C2, C3, and
C4. Then h satisfies the Hausdorff property (in the topology TðhÞ introduced in
Definition 5).
Proof Pick any distinct e1; e2 2 h; because e1 6 e2 and e2 6 e1 would entail
e1 = e2, we may assume without loss of generality that e1 6 e2. By Lemma 34, C1
and C3 imply that e1 2 5ðxÞ \ h and e2 ðxÞ \ h for some x 2 h, where ð5ðxÞ \
hÞ \ ð ðxÞ \ hÞ ¼£ by definition. ðxÞ \ h 2 TðhÞ by Lemma 31, whereas C2
and C4 entail 5ðxÞ \ h 2 TðhÞ by Lemma 24. h
It may be worth noting that Theorem 35 can also be proved with 4ðxÞ and (x)
as in the following lemma (which, however, does not extend to Our World in the
way Lemma 31 extends to Corollary 32).
Lemma 36 For any x 2 W , let
x e W xe is not minimal in We
Then ðxÞ \ h 2 TðhÞ for any history h such that x 2 h.
Proof Fix any e 2 ðxÞ
T
h and t 2 MCðhÞ such that e 2 t. Since e is not
minimal, t\e 6¼£. So Fact 33 implies z 6 x for some z 2 t\e; moreover, for any
y > z, y 6 x and y is not minimal. Without loss of generality we may assume that z
is not minimal (since if it is we can find some z0 2 t such that z\z0\e and hence
z0 6 x and z0 is not minimal). Therefore, for any y 2 t [ e, we have z \ e \ y and
dzy  ðxÞ. h
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To comment on the results of this section, each single history h (aka space-time)
of a BST model satisfies the Hausdorff property with respect to the Bartha topology
TðhÞ, provided that h satisfies conditions C1–C4. In turn, these conditions are
needed in order that a light-cone in a BST history have some typical properties
required of light-cones of space-time physics. This ultimately responds to an
objections voiced by Earman (2008) that space-times of BST are non-Hausdorff.
5 Hausdorff Property on Our World
In this section we are after a completely different game: Instead of focusing on
single histories, we ask about a topological feature of Our World of many branching
histories.
To present our next theorem, we need to introduce a particular feature of BST,
called ‘‘passive indeterminism,’’ formerly labeled ‘‘indeterminism without choice’’
(cf. Belnap 1992) or ‘‘indeterminism with external choice.’’ It is impossible to be
both brief and precise. The rough intuitive idea, spelled out in detail in Belnap
(2005), is that there is a single initial event, I, serving as the common initial of
multiple contingent transitions, each with its own event, Oj, as possible outcome. I
must lie in the causal past of each Oj. If I is a point event, e, and if O is an
immediate outcome of e (no intervening events), then the transition e! O is a
causa causans or originating cause that is not subject to further causal analysis. A
causa causans might well be labeled as a case of active indeterminism. In the more
typical case, a contingent transition, I! O is not a causa causans; instead, it has its
own set of causae causantes external to it that provably form a set of inus conditions
in the sense of Mackie (1974): Each is an insufficient but nonredundant
(conjunctive) part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition of I! O. Such an
I! O illustrates passive indeterminism, since the activity resides in its causae
causantes, the initials of which always lie in the past of O. For example, suppose
you have already placed your bet on the (future) decay of an a-particle. It may be
that the transition from bet-placed to bet-won is indeterministic, but what causes the
win (if you win) is, say, the detection of the decay of the a-particle.
Passive indeterminism can be cleanly characterized by considering various ways
in which two maximal chains t1; t2 2 MCðWÞ can form a Y-shaped fork.
Definition 37 (Y-fork) t1; t2 2 MCðWÞ form a Y-fork iff
1. t1 = t2,
2. t1 \ t2 6¼£,
3. 8x 2 t1 [ t2ðx 2 t1 \ t2 _ t1 \ t2\xÞ.
Every Y-fork has its trunk t1 \ t2, and two arms t1nt2 and t2nt1. A Y-fork may be
entirely a spatio-temporal matter. In order to characterize Y-forks that exhibit
indeterminism, we define a ‘‘modal fork’’ as follows.
Definition 38 (modal-fork) t1; t2 2 MCðWÞ form a modal fork iff they form a
Y-fork and 9h1; h2 2 Hist ðt1nt2  h1nh2 ^ t2nt1  h2nh1Þ.
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In the presence of Definition 37, the condition on modal forks is equivalent to this
claim:
8x 2 t1 [ t2ðt1 \ t2\x! x 2 h1nh2 _ x 2 h2nh1Þ:
There is a simple topological test for whether or not a certain modal Y-fork
exhibits passive indeterminism. If its trunk, t1\ t2, has a (unique) maximum, e, then
e is the initial of two causae causantes, the left fork being one possible outcome,
and the right fork the other, and the indeterminism may be called ‘‘active.’’ If,
however, the trunk has no maximum, the Y-fork exhibits passive indeterminism,
and we must look elsewhere for the relevant causae causantes (cf. Belnap 2005).
For our topological purposes, we convert this test into a definition.
Definition 39 (passive indeterminism) A modal fork exhibits passive indetermin-
ism in case its trunk has no maximum.
The upshot of these definitions is a threefold classification of Y-forks. A Y-fork
may be modal or not, and if is modal, it either exhibits passive indeterminism or not.
Note that the essence of passive indeterminism is not a matter of lacking a choice
event (this is impossible by the prior choice principle of BST), but that every choice
event is external to the modal fork in question. The lemma that follows the fact
below shows a crucial feature of passive indeterminism:
Fact 40 (1) Let t1; t2 2 MCðWÞ form a Y-fork. Then its trunk is upper bounded by
an element of each of t1nt2 and t2nt1. (2) And, if t1, t2 form a modal fork, i.e., for
some h1; h2 2 Hist, t2nt1  h1nh2 and t2nt1  h2nh1, then 8x 2 t1 [ t2 ðx 2 h1 \
h2 ! x 2 t1 \ t2Þ.
Proof Ad 1. By Definition 37(1) and maximality of t1, t2, there is x 2 t1nt2, so
x 62 t1 \ t2, so t1\ t2 \ x by Definition 37(3); and similarly for t2nt1. Ad 2. The result
follows by observing that t1 [ t2 ¼ ðt1 \ t2Þ [ ðt1nt2Þ [ ðt2nt1Þ. h
Lemma 41 The following two claims are equivalent, for t1; t2 2 MCðWÞ:
1. t1, t2 form a modal fork and t1 \ t2 has no maximum;
2. there exist suph1ðt1 \ t2Þ and suph2ðt1 \ t2Þ and suph1ðt1 \ t2Þ 6¼ suph2ðt1 \ t2Þ
for some h1; h2 2 Hist.
Proof From (1) to (2). Let us abbreviate C ¼ ðt1 \ t2Þ, c1 ¼ suph1ðCÞ, D1 ¼
ðt1nt2Þ, and similarly for c2, D2. We show that c1 6¼ c2.
Note that ðC [ D1Þ ¼ t1 by calculation, C 6¼£ by Definition 37(2), D1 6¼£ by
Fact 40, and C\D1 by Definition 37(3). By Definition 38, D1  h1nh2, so C  h1 by
downward closure of histories, so c1 exists (by the BST axiom of history-relative
suprema) and C 6 c1 6 D1. Since ðC [ D1Þ ¼ t1, density and maximality of t1 imply
that c1 2 ðC [ D1Þ. If c1 2 C, then c1 would be maximum in C, violating assumption
(1) of the Lemma. So c1 2 D1. An exactly parallel argument yields c2 2 D2. Since
ðD1 \ D2Þ ¼£, c1 6¼ c2. From (2) to (1). suph1ðt1 \ t2Þ 6¼ suph2ðt1 \ t2Þ implies that
t1 \ t2 has no maximum. It is straightforward to see that t1, t2 form a modal fork. h
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We are now ready to state our first theorem concerning the Hausdorff property in
the topology TðWÞ.
Theorem 42 Let OW be a BST model. If some modal fork in OW exhibits passive
indeterminism, then the Hausdorff property fails in OW (in the topology TðWÞ).
Proof Let t1; t2 2 MCðWÞ form a modal fork exhibiting passive indeterminism.
Then by Lemma 41 there are histories h1, h2 such that t1 \ t2  h1 \ h2 and
e1 :¼ suph1ðt1 \ t2Þ 6¼ suph2ðt1 \ t2Þ ¼: e2. Let e1 2 U and e2 2 V , where U and V
are arbitrary open subsets of W. Since U is open, there must be x1 2 t1 \ t2 such that
x1 \ e1 and 8xðx1 6 x 6 e1 ! x 2 UÞ. For a similar reason there is x2 2 t1 \ t2
such that x2 \ e2 and 8xðx2 6 x 6 e2 ! x 2 VÞ. Thus, max ðx1; x2Þ 2 U \ V . h
A natural question, answered by the lemma below, is, How ubiquitous is passive
indeterminism?13
Lemma 43 Let e be a choice point between histories h and h0 (to be written as
e 2 CPðh; h0Þ) in a BST model and for some e0 6¼ e, e0 2 flchðeÞ and
8cðc 2 CPðh; h0Þ ^ c\e0 ! c ¼ eÞ. Then there is passive indeterminism in the
model.
Proof Clearly, e; e0 2 h and by Fact 13 (1) and the antecedent, e\e0. Also (y)
e0 62 h0—otherwise e would not be a choice point for h and h0. e0 2 flchðeÞ entails
that (z) 9t 2 MCðhÞ ðe0 ¼ inf ðt>eÞÞ. Consider t 6>e. Since e 6 t>e, e 6¼ inf ðt>eÞ, and t
is maximal, t 6>e 6¼£. Since it is upper bounded by e0, it has a supremum and
suph ðt 6>eÞ ¼ e0 (by z). We next argue that t 6>e  h0. Otherwise for some e 2 t 6>e,
e 62 h0 and hence e 2 hnh0, so by PCP, 9c 2 CPðh; h0Þðc\eÞ. But because
e 2 t 6>e, e 6\e. Hence c = e and since c\e 6 e0, we have a contradiction with
the Lemma’s premise.
We may thus consider suph0 ðt 6>eÞ ¼ s. (y) then requires that s 6¼ e0.
We thus constructed a trunk t 6>e of a modal fork, with two (different) history-relative
suprema. By Lemma 41 and Definition 39, the fork exhibits passive indeterminism. h
To comment on this Lemma, putting aside some pathological BST models, if a
BST model has more than one history, it exhibits passive indeterminism. The
pathology means that either for every choice point e, flch(e) = {e} for any h such
that e 2 h,14 or each choice point between some h, h0 is a point of convergence of a
sequence of choice points between h and h0. Combining our Theorem 42 and
Lemma 43, we obtain the following:
Theorem 44 Let e 2 CPðh; h0Þ for some histories h; h0 in a BST model OW and for
some e0 6¼ e, e0 2 flchðeÞ and 8c 8c ðc 2 CPðh; h0Þ ^ c \ e0 ! c ¼ eÞ. Then the
Hausdorff property fails in OW (in the topology TðWÞ).
13 The conclusion of this lemma, namely, the existence of passive indeterminism, can be also proved by
postulating No Modal Funny Business instead of the lemma’s second premise, i.e., instead of
8cðc 2 CPðh; h0Þ ^ c\e0 ! c ¼ eÞ. For a definition of No Modal Funny Business, cf. Def. 1–2 of Belnap
(2003b).
14 Note that this is satisfied in BT models, so these models do not exhibit passive indeterminism.
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It is still interesting to learn what happens if a BST model has no passive
indeterminism, which is a subject of Theorem 47. Note however that no passive
indeterminism in a BST model means that either the model has one history only, or
(by Lemma 43) is pathological.
We can prove Theorem 47 using the same idea that we used to prove Theorem
35, since Fact 33 carries over to OW in the absence of passive indeterminism.
Fact 45 Suppose no modal fork in OW exhibits passive indeterminism. Then, for
any e1; e2 2 W and t 2 MCðWÞ such that e1 2 t and t\e1 6¼£, if e1 6 e2 then
x 6 e2 for some x 2 t\e1 .
Proof Suppose e1 6 e2 but that x O e2 for all x 2 t\e1 . Pick any h1 2 Hðe1Þ and
h2 2 Hðe2Þ; moreover, since t\e1 6 e2, there is t2 2 MCðh2Þ such that
t\e1 [ fe2g  t2. Then e1 ¼ suph1ðt\e1Þ whereas suph2ðt\e1Þ 6 e2; hence e1 6 e2
implies suph1ðt\e1Þ 6¼ suph2ðt\e1Þ, which means that e1 62 h2, which moreover
entails t \ t2 ¼ t\e1 . Therefore, by Lemma 41, the modal fork t, t2 exhibits passive
indeterminism. h
Lemma 46 Suppose no modal fork in OW exhibits passive indeterminism, that OW
satisfies C3, and that e1 6 e2 for e1; e2 2 W . Then there is some x 2 W such that
x 2 4ðe1Þ (which implies e1 2 5ðxÞ if W satisfies C1) and e2 2 ðxÞ.
Proof Similar to the proof of Lemma 34, using Fact 45 in place of Fact 33. h
Theorem 47 Let OW be a BST model, in which every history satisfies conditions
C1, C2, C3, and C4. Then if no modal fork in OW exhibits passive indeterminism,
the Hausdorff property is satisfied in OW (in the topology TðWÞ).
Proof Exactly similar to the proof of Theorem 35. Pick any distinct e1; e2 2 W;
without loss of generality we may assume e1 6 e2. By Lemma 46, C1 and C3 imply
that e1 2 5ðxÞ and e2 2 ðxÞ for some x 2 W , where 5ðxÞ\ ðxÞ ¼£ by
definition. ðxÞ 2 TðWÞ by Corollary 32, whereas C2 and C4 entail 5ðxÞ 2 TðWÞ
by Corollary 29. h
The theorems of this section nicely contrast with our results concerning single
histories: With a few exceptions, a BST model hW ;6i is non-Hausdorff with
respect to the Bartha topology on W.
6 Naturalness of the BST Topologies
All our results above obtain with respect to specific topologies: the Bartha topology
TðhÞ on a BST history, and the Bartha topology TðWÞ on a BST model. This
naturally raises a question about strength and relevancy of these results. Aren’t
perhaps the Bartha topologies some gerrymandered and ad hoc constructions,
cooked up just to to guarantee that the lemma and theorems above hold? Against
this objection in each of the next three subsections we provide an independent
argument that the Bartha topologies on a BST model and its histories are natural
topologies:
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1. In appropriate cases, the Bartha topology on a single history (spacetime) agrees
with the standard topology on Rn.
2. Both on a BST model and on a history thereof, the Bartha topology naturally
extends the BST structure.
3. The Bartha topology on Our World, an entire BST model, is canonically
constructed from the Bartha topologies on its histories.
6.1 Extending the Minkowski Structure
One simple criterion of ‘‘naturalness’’ of topology is whether it agrees with the
standard ‘‘ball’’ topology on Rn, if its base set is isomorphic to Rn. It is easy to see
that the criterion is satisfied by the Bartha topology on a history, TðhÞ. There is a
particular class of BST models, called Minkowskian Branching Structures (MBS’s)
and extensively studied by Müller (2002), Wroński and Placek (2009), and Placek
and Belnap (2012), in which histories are isomorphic to Rn with Minkowskian
ordering. More specifically, elements of an MBS’s base set are certain equivalence
classes ½rx, where r 2 R for some index set R and x 2 Rn, whereas the ordering
generalizes the Minkowskian ordering on Rn. Each history in an MBS is then
identified with set br ¼ f½rxjx 2 Rng for some r 2 R. To inquire what borderless
diamonds in history br are (recall that such diamonds form the base of the Bartha
topology on a history, TðbrÞ), we get that they have the form:
bd½rx½ry ¼ f½rz 2 brjx\M z\M y ^ z 62 flcðxÞ [ blcðyÞg;
where \M is the strict companion of the Minkowskian ordering on Rn and
flc(x), blc(x) are the future light-cone and the backward light-cone of x 2 Rn. A little
reflection on the condition above convinces one that z is an element of the bor-
derless diamond in Rn, with x its bottom diamond and y its top diamond. Such
borderless diamonds are open in the standard topology on Rn. Thus, the base for the
Bartha topology on a Minkowskian Branching Structure is provided by the sets of
the form bd½rx½ry, whose ‘‘numerical’’ parts are open sets in the standard topology
on Rn.
6.2 Topological Limits and BST Limits
Two notions of limits are involved with BST and topology. One is an intrinsic
ingredient of BST, namely, inf and sup. The other is the convergence of ‘‘nets’’
(a generalization of sequences) in topology—any topology gives rise to a
convergence relation between nets and points. Indeed, topologies are fully
characterized by convergence relations, in the sense that different topologies give
different convergence relations, and that any topology can be recovered from the
convergence relation it gives. Therefore any natural topology of BST must give a
topological limit (that is, a convergence) that extends the BST limit (that is, inf and
sup), in the sense that the two kinds of limits agree whenever the latter makes sense.
This is in fact the case with the Bartha topology, as in Theorems 49 and 50 below.
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A net is a function from a directed set ðD;6Þ to a topological space X.15 A salient
example is a sequence in X, that is, a map from ðN;6Þ to X. The formal concept of
convergence of a net is a formalization (and generalization) of the idea that a
sequence may ‘‘get arbitrarily close’’ to a point x 2 X. The notion of closeness
involved in this idea is abstractly captured by the topology on X. On the other hand,
the idea also involves a somewhat temporal aspect: When f ðnÞ is closer to x than
f ðmÞ is, whether the sequence f gets closer to or farther from x between the two
‘‘stages’’ n and m hinges on whether n is ‘‘after’’ m or not, which is expressed by the
order on the domain D of a net.
The definition of convergence goes as follows. Given a net f : D ? X and a subset
U  X, we say that f ‘‘eventually stays’’ in U if there is a 2 D such that f ðbÞ 2 U for
every b > a. For instance, a sequence f : N! X eventually stays in U  X if,
‘‘after’’ some stage n, f is always in U (meaning, f ðmÞ 2 U for every m > n). Given
this notion of eventually staying, and given the topological abstraction of
‘‘closeness’’ (points in an open set U containing x are ‘‘closer’’ to x than ones
outside U), the idea of ‘‘getting arbitrarily close’’ is formalized as follows: A net f
converges (in the given topology of X) to a point x 2 X if, for every open set U
containing x, f eventually stays in U (that is, there is a 2 D such that f ðbÞ 2 U for
every b > a).
As a particular case, a chain C in a BST model ðW ;6Þ can be regarded as a net
by taking the inclusion map i : C ! W , which maps x 2 C to x itself. A warning
may well be in order, that there is going to be possible confusion, because the same
points x 2 C are serving once as points of the directed domain (that is, as ‘‘stages’’)
of a net, and once as points of spacetimes or of Our World, and because the same
ordering 6 is used, once as the ordering on the directed domain (the ordering of
stages) of the net, and once as the BST ordering (of causal past and future). To avoid
confusion, we reserve the temporal phrasing (‘‘after’’) for when we emphasize the
order as the ordering on the domain of a net, and, taking advantage of familiar
pictures of Our World, we say that a point x 2 W is ‘‘below’’ or ‘‘above’’ y (if x 6 y
or y 6 x) to emphasize the order as the BST ordering.
A chain C in a BST model ðW ;6Þ can be regarded as an ‘‘ascending’’ net
(ascending in terms of the ‘‘above’’ phrasing we just introduced), by taking the
inclusion map i from ðC;6Þ into W, which preserves the order; that is, x 6 y in the
domain ðC;6Þ means that y is ‘‘after’’ x, whereas x 6 y in ðW ;6Þ means that y is
‘‘above’’ x, so that C goes up and up. Therefore, C (as an ascending net) converges
in TðWÞ to e 2 W if, for every U 2 TðWÞ containing e, there is x 2 C such that
y ¼ iðyÞ 2 U for every y 2 C ‘‘after’’ x (meaning, y > x), that is, x 2 C such that
C>x  U.
C can also be regarded as a ‘‘descending’’ net, by taking the inclusion map i from
ðC;>Þ into W, which reverses the order; that is, x > y in ðC;>Þ means that y is
‘‘after’’ x, whereas y 6 x in ðW ;6Þ means that y is ‘‘below’’ x, so that C goes down
and down. Therefore, C (as a descending net) converges in TðWÞ to e 2 W if, for
every U 2 TðWÞ containing e, there is x 2 C such that y ¼ iðyÞ 2 U for every y 2 C
‘‘after’’ x (this time meaning y 6 x), that is, x 2 C such that C6x  U.
15 In general, antisymmetry is not assumed on the order 6 on D. See, e.g., Willard (1970, pp. 73–77).
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Lemma 48 Fix a history h, and let X be either h or W. Then, given any chain
C  h, both of the following hold.
1. C regarded as a descending net converges in TðXÞ to infðCÞ if it exists.
2. C regarded as an ascending net converges in TðXÞ to suphðCÞ if it exists.
Proof Ad 1. Suppose infðCÞ exists. We show that C (as a descending net)
converges in TðXÞ to infðCÞ, which means that, for every U 2 TðXÞ containing
infðCÞ, there is x 2 C such that C6x  U.
Fix any U 2 TðXÞ containing infðCÞ. If infðCÞ is minimal in X then U = X and
hence C6x  U for any x 2 C (C 6¼£ since infðCÞ exists); so suppose infðCÞ is not
minimal in X. Since infðCÞ 6 C, there is t 2 MCðhÞ containing both C and infðCÞ;
therefore infðCÞ 2 U 2 TðXÞ means that there are z; y 2 t such that z\ infðCÞ\y
and dzy  U (such z exists since infðCÞ is not minimal in X). Then there is x 2 C
such that x 6 y (for otherwise y 6 C and hence y 6 infðCÞ). This and z\ infðCÞ 6
C imply C6x  dzy  U. Thus C converges to infðCÞ in TðXÞ.
A proof that is symmetrical (except dropping the case of minimal infðCÞ) would
verify (2). h
Note that a topology is Hausdorff if and only if every net in it converges to at
most one point. Therefore Lemma 48.2 with X = W gives another proof that TðWÞ
fails to be Hausdorff when a modal fork t1, t2 (t1 2 MCðh1Þ; t2 2 MCðh2Þ) exhibits
passive indeterminism, because then the trunk C = t1 \ t2 converges to two distinct
points, namely, suph1ðCÞ 6¼ suph2ðCÞ.
Theorem 49 Suppose a history h has no minimal elements. Then, given any chain
C  h and e 2 h, both of the following hold.
1. C regarded as a descending net converges in TðhÞ to e iff e ¼ infðCÞ.
2. C regarded as an ascending net converges in TðhÞ to e iff e ¼ suphðCÞ.
Proof Ad 1. The ‘‘if’’ direction is just Lemma 48.1. For the ‘‘only if’’ direction,
suppose C converges in TðhÞ to e.
Suppose for contradiction that e 6 C; then e 6 x for some x 2 C. By Lemma 36,
e 2 ðxÞ \ h 2 TðhÞ (since e is not minimal), whereas C6x 6 x means ð
ðxÞ \ hÞ \ C6x ¼£, contradicting C converging to e. Thus e 6 C.
The convergence of C entails C 6¼£; so the lowerbounded C has infðCÞ. If
infðCÞ 6 e, then e 2 ðinfðCÞÞ \ h 2 TðhÞ by Lemma 31, whereas infðCÞ 6 C
means ð ðinfðCÞÞ \ hÞ \ C ¼£, contradicting C converging to e; so infðCÞ 6 e.
Hence infðCÞ ¼ e, because e 6 C implies e 6 infðCÞ.
A symmetrical proof would verify (2). h
Theorem 50 Suppose W satisfies C1–C4. Then, given any chain C and e 2 W,
both of the following hold.
1. C regarded as a descending net converges in TðWÞ to e iff e ¼ infðCÞ.
2. C regarded as an ascending net converges in TðWÞ to e iff e ¼ suphðCÞ for
some history h.
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Proof Ad 1. The ‘‘if’’ direction is just Lemma 48.1. For the ‘‘only if’’ direction,
suppose C as a descending net converges in TðWÞ to e, and pick any histories h1 and
h2 containing e and C, respectively. Applying C3, pick t1 2 MCðh1Þ such that e 2 t1
and t1
\e 6¼£ but t1\e \ blch1ðeÞ ¼£.
We first claim that, for any x 2 C, if e 6 x then suph2ðt1\eÞ 6 x. Assuming e 6 x
for x 2 C, suppose for contradiction that t1\e 6 x; that is, e0 6 x for some e0 2 t1\e.
Then t1
\e \ blch1ðeÞ ¼£ implies e 2 5ðe0Þ by C1, whereas5ðe0Þ 2 TðWÞ by C2,
C4 and Corollary 29. On the other hand, C6x \5ðe0Þ ¼£ because e0 6 x implies
e0 6 y for every y 6 x. These contradict since C converges to e. Therefore t1\e 6 x.
This implies suph2ðt1\eÞ 6 x since t1\e 6¼£ and x 2 C  h2.
Now suppose for contradiction that e 6 C; that is, e 6 x for some x 2 C. Then,
indeed, e 6 y for every y 2 C6x; hence the claim we showed above implies
suph2ðt1\eÞ 6 C6x. Therefore ðsuph2ðt1\eÞÞ \ C6x ¼£. On the other hand, e 2
ðsuph2ðt1\eÞÞ 2 TðWÞ (by Corollary 32), because e ¼ suph1ðt1\eÞ 6¼ suph2ðt1\eÞ 6 x
implies suph2ðt1\eÞ 6 e. These contradict since C converges to e. Thus eOC.
The convergence of C entails C 6¼£; so the lowerbounded C has infðCÞ. If infðCÞ 6
6 e then e 2 ðinfðCÞÞ 2 TðWÞ (by Corollary 32), whereas infðCÞ 6 C means
ðinfðCÞÞ \ C ¼£, contradicting C converging to e; so infðCÞ 6 e. Hence
infðCÞ ¼ e, because eOC implies e 6 infðCÞ.
Ad 2. The ‘‘if’’ direction is just Lemma 48.2. For the ‘‘only if’’ direction, suppose C
as an ascending net converges in TðWÞ to e.
Suppose for contradiction that C 6 e; that is, x 6 e for some x 2 C. This means e 2
ðxÞ 2 TðWÞ (by Corollary 32), whereas x 6 C>x means ðxÞ \ C>x ¼£,
contradicting C converging to e. Thus COe.
The convergence of C entails C 6¼£; so, for h 2 HðeÞ, C 6 e 2 h implies C  h
and that suphðCÞ exists. Suppose for contradiction that e 6 suphðCÞ. Then, since
e; suphðCÞ 2 h, Lemma 34 implies by C1, C3 that e 2 5ðxÞ and x 6 suphðCÞ for
some x 2 h. By C2, C4 and Corollary 29, 5ðxÞ 2 TðWÞ, whereas x 6 suphðCÞ
implies xOy for no y 2 C and hence5ðxÞ \ C ¼£, contradicting C converging to
e. Thus e 6 suphðCÞ. Therefore e ¼ suphðCÞ because C 6 e 2 h and suphðCÞ 6 e. h
6.3 Branching for the Laplaceans
This subsection dwells on a consequence of Theorem 7, namely that the Bartha
topology TðWÞ on Our World can be regarded as naturally constructed from the Bartha
topologies TðhÞ on the histories h; so, to the extent that TðhÞ are natural, the
naturalness propagates to TðWÞ. This naturalness is based on ‘‘universal mapping
properties,’’ and applies not just to the theory of BST but also to the Laplacean
diverging spacetimes, in the following manner: Given an ensemble of spacetimes that
comes with a criterion of ‘‘identifying’’ points of different spacetimes, we can think of
a branching structure constructed by naturally gluing those spacetimes together at
identified points. This branching structure is to the diverging spacetimes what a BST
structure W is to its histories h (we will show in which sense). Then Theorem 7 points to
how, given topologies on branching histories or diverging spacetimes, to naturally
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construct from them a topology on the branching structure, whether it is a BST
branching or an ensemble branching.
We first lay out a natural construction in which to glue spacetimes (as sets)
together into one branching structure (as a set). Suppose, along the line of
‘‘ensemble branching’’ (see Sect. 2), that we are given an ensemble Hist of
spacetimes h and a criterion for ‘‘identifying’’ points of different spacetimes (for
instance, sharing the same genuine physical magnitudes). Formally, take the disjoint
union
P
h h of histories and write xRy to mean that x; y 2
P
h h are ‘‘identified.’’ The
disjoint union
P
h h can simply be the union
S
h h if all histories are mutually
disjoint (as in Lewis’s ‘‘divergence’’); otherwise, we label points of histories and letP
h h ¼ fðe; hÞje 2 h 2 Histg. Finally, let W be the quotient of
P
h h by the relation
R.16 Let us call the set W constructed in this way from a given ensemble Hist with a
given relation R (on
P
h h) the branching structure for Hist and R; in short, W is an
ensemble Hist of spacetimes glued together at points identified by a relation R.
This ‘‘gluing’’ construction gives us the natural structure of branching, in the
following sense. Let us express the construction in terms of the following two sorts
of maps: One is the family of inclusion maps mh0 : h
0 !
P
h h, each of which maps
e 2 h0 to ðe; h0Þ (or to e itself if h are all disjoint). The other is the quotient map q :P
h h ? W, which maps x 2
P
h h to the equivalence class [x] of points identified
with x. Then the construction of the branching structure yields the following
‘‘universal mapping property’’:17
Fact 51 Given a family Hist and a relation R on
P
h h (which may or may not be
an equivalence relation), the branching structure W for Hist and R, with maps mh : h
?
P
h h and q :
P
h h ? W, is the unique (up to isomorphism) set that satisfies the
following.
1. W identifies all that has to be identified; that is, if R identifies e1 2 h1 and
e2 2 h2—in the sense that mh1ðe1ÞRmh2ðe2Þ—then q 	mh1ðe1Þ ¼ q 	mh2ðe2Þ
2 W .
2. For any set X and a family of maps fh : h ? X (h 2 Hist,) if the family fh respects
R—in the sense that fh1ðe1Þ ¼ fh2ðe2Þ whenever mh1ðe1ÞRmh2ðe2Þ—then there is
a unique map f : W ? X such that f 	 q 	mh ¼ fh for all h 2 Hist.
This fact can also be put as follows:
Corollary 52 Let W be the branching structure for a family Hist of sets and a
relation R on
P
h h. Then, for any set X, the families of maps fh : h ? X ðh 2 HistÞ
that respect R correspond one-to-one to the maps f : W ? X.
Proof For the correspondence ‘‘to the right,’’ associate with a given R-respecting
family fh : h ? X the map f : W ? X as in Fact 51.2. ‘‘To the left,’’ associate with
given f : W ? X the family f 	 q 	mh : h! X, which respects R by Fact 51.1. And
the correspondence is bijective by Fact 51.2. h
16 When R is not itself an equivalence relation, by ‘‘the quotient by R’’ we mean the quotient by the
equivalence relation that R generates.
17 See Brown (2006, p. 100), for a proof (of essentially the same fact). The results that follow are
essentially ones laid out in Brown (2006, pp. 100f.).
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These results mean the following. We may wish to assign some value (a vector,
for instance) to each point of every spacetime h; that is to take a family of maps fh :
h ? X (say, to a vector space X). Then, as long as this assignment is coherent with
the relevant criterion of identifying points of different spacetimes (for instance,
assigning the same vector to points sharing the same physical magnitudes), f : W ?
X as in Fact 51.2 gives an equivalent description of the assignment—carrying all
and only the information carried by the family fh—in the form of a single map. And
W is the only set that provides the domain for such a corresponding map f.
It is worth noting that, given a BST model ðW ;6Þ, the set W is (isomorphic to)
the branching structure, in the sense we defined above, for its set of histories Hist
and the obvious relation R of identification (that is, ðe1; h1Þ R ðe2; h2Þ iff e1 ¼ e2);
then each q 	mh is just the inclusion map ih : h ? W, which sends
e 2 h to mhðeÞ ¼ ðe; hÞ to qðe; hÞ ¼ e.18 In short, W is ‘‘reconstructed’’ by first
labeling events and then dropping the labels. Hence, W with mh and q satisfies Fact
51 and Corollary 52 for its histories Hist and the obvious R.
Let us now turn to Theorem 7. We can read it as follows: The Bartha topology
TðWÞ on Our World, which is concretely defined in terms of diamonds dxy, can also
be constructed from the family of Bartha topologies TðhÞ on histories h 2 Hist by
setting TðWÞ ¼ fA  W jA \ h 2 TðhÞ for all h 2 Histg, or, in other words, as the
finest topology on W that has each inclusion map ih : h ? W continuous (note that A
\ h = ih-1[A] for A  W; TðWÞ is the finest because, if another topology T0 on W
has all ih continuous, then every A 2 T0 has A \ h ¼ ih1½A 2 TðhÞ for all h 2 Hist
and hence A 2 TðWÞ, that is, T0  TðWÞ). This construction is a common one in
topology, a particular case of the construction of gluing several spaces (not just as
sets but as sets plus topologies) together into one.19
This construction can indeed be generalized and applied to any branching
structure W—not only of BST histories but also of divergent spacetimes—by
replacing the inclusion maps ih with maps q 	mh in general, as follows. Let
Tð
P
h hÞ be the ‘‘disjoint union topology,’’ that is, the finest topology on
P
h h that
makes all mh continuous—more concretely, Tð
P
h hÞ ¼ fB 
P
h hjmh0 1½B 2
Tðh0Þ for all h0 2 Histg. Then let TðWÞ be the ‘‘quotient topology,’’ that is, the finest
topology on W that makes q continuous—TðWÞ ¼ fA  W jq1½A 2 Tð
P
h hÞg ¼
fA  W jðq 	mhÞ1½A 2 TðhÞ for all h 2 Histg. Thus any branching structure W,
whether it is a BST one or a diverging one, accommodates the gluing construction
of TðWÞ from TðhÞ. Let us call such TðWÞ the branching topology for Hist, R and
the family of topologies TðhÞ.
The branching topology TðWÞ constructed on a branching structure W in the
manner above is the natural topology on W for the following reason. Recall that,
given any ensemble Hist of histories or spacetimes (whether it comes from a BST
18 Strictly speaking, W is not itself the branching structure in the defined sense: W is a set of events,
whereas we take as the branching structure a set of equivalence classes of event-history pairs; so q(e, h) is
not e, but rather fðe; h0Þje 2 h0 2 Histg ¼ feg 
 HðeÞ. Yet W is isomorphic to the branching structure:
e and {e} 9 HðeÞ are in an obvious one-to-one correspondence.
19 For a variety of such constructions, see, e.g., Willard (1970, pp. 59–69), and Brown (2006,
pp. 97–105).
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structure or from divergence) and any relation R on
P
h h (that serves as a criterion
for identifying points of different spacetimes), the naturalness of the branching
structure W for Hist and R is captured by the correspondence stated in Fact 51 and
Corollary 52. This correspondence, on the level of sets and maps, extends to the
topological level:
Fact 53 Let the set W be the branching structure (as a set) for a family Hist of
topological spaces and a relation R on
P
h h; write TðhÞ for the topology on h 2
Hist. Given any topological space X and a family of maps fh : h ? X ðh 2 HistÞ that
respects R, consider the map f : W ? X given by Fact 51.2. Then TðWÞ is the unique
topology on W that satisfies: () f is continuous iff all fh are continuous (with TðhÞ).
Proof The ‘‘only if’’ part of () holds for TðWÞ because fh ¼ f 	 q 	mh while the
composition of continuous maps is continuous (q and mh are continuous).
For the ‘‘if’’ part of () for TðWÞ, suppose fh are all continuous and fix any open
subset U of X. Then, for each h 2 Hist, the continuity of fh implies fh1½U 2 TðhÞ,
whereas fh
1½U ¼ ðf 	 q 	mhÞ1½U ¼ ðq 	mhÞ1½f1½U. Thus ðq 	mhÞ1½f1½U
2 TðhÞ for all h 2 Hist, which means f1½U 2 TðWÞ by the construction of TðWÞ.
For the uniqueness part, fix any topology T0 on W that satisfies (). Let us take
q 	mh : h! W as fh : h ? X; then f is the identity map i : W ? W. Since f = i is
continuous from T0 to T0, the ‘‘only if’’ part of () for T0 implies that all fh ¼
q 	mh are continuous from TðhÞ to T0. Therefore the ‘‘if’’ part of () for TðWÞ
implies that f = i is continuous from TðWÞ to T0, which means T0  TðWÞ
because i-1[U] = U. On the other hand, the ‘‘if’’ part of () for T0 implies that f = i
is continuous from T0 to TðWÞ, that is, TðWÞ  T0. Thus T0 ¼ TðWÞ. h
While we may express assignment of values (or vectors, etc.) to points of
spacetimes h by a family of maps fh : h ? X, it may then be desirable to distinguish
continuous assignments of values from non-continuous ones. This distinction is
made by the topologies TðhÞ (as well as by the topology on X). Recall that, when
such an assignment is coherent with the criterion of identifying points of different
spacetimes, it is equivalently described by a single map f : W ? X. Then Fact 53
means that TðWÞ is the only topology that agrees with the family TðhÞ regarding
whether the assignment is continuous or not.20
In sum, these facts establish that, given an ensemble Hist of histories h and their
topologies TðhÞ, the branching structure W and the branching topology TðWÞ
obtained with the gluing constructions are the natural structure of branching for
Hist, whether the family Hist comes from a BST model or from divergence. These
20 It may be worth noting that the gluing construction can also be extended to orderings on the histories h.
Suppose we are given a set Hist of preordered sets ðh;†hÞ and a relation R on
P
h h. (A preorder is a
reflexive and transitive relation, that is, a partial order without antisymmetry assumed.) On the branching
structure W for Hist and R, we can define the ‘‘branching order for the family †h’’ as the smallest
preorder on W with which all q 	mh preserve order. Then the preorder version of Fact 53 is available. The
BST ordering on any BST model (W, O) is in fact the branching order, in this sense, for the family of its
restrictions to histories h. We should however note that, in non-BST cases, this construction works for
preorders but not necessarily for partial orders: There may be no partial order on the branching structure
with which all q 	mh preserve order (whether †h are partial orders or just preorders).
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two constructs are characterized by the two universal mapping properties expressed
by Facts 51 through 53—one of them assures a correspondence between maps f and
families of maps fh, while the other assures their agreement on continuity. The
constructions are so natural that any theory of branching, whether it is BST or of
ensemble-branching type, would have to admit them.
This does not mean that any theory of branching of spacetimes, if guided by the
requirement of naturalness, must satisfy the BST axioms and adopt Bartha
topologies. We merely claimed that the gluing constructions are natural in the sense
that, given any histories h and topologies TðhÞ on them, their branching structure W
and branching topology TðWÞ should be in a certain relation with them. This has no
consequences for other features of the theory of BST—for instance, the prior choice
principle. An ensemble branching with a significantly different criterion R of
identifying points of spacetimes, or with significantly different topologies, although
it has to construct W and TðWÞ by gluing, may end up with significantly different
features of branching and topology on W. In a slogan, branching is everywhere,
though it might be different from the BST branching.
7 Conclusions
We began this study by inquiring whether Belnap’s (1992) theory of branching
spacetimes satisfies the critical Hausdorff property. To ask a sensible question
required both a rigorous account of BST models hW ;6i and a reasonable topology
for Our World, W, and for each of its histories, h. The definition of BST models
came from Belnap (1992), and to satisfy the second requirement, we adopted the
‘‘Bartha topology,’’ aka ‘‘the diamond topology,’’ as the best choice, both for
defining the class TðWÞ of open sets of W and the class TðhÞ of open sets of each
history, h. Our Theorem 7 shows then a relation between open sets of W and open
sets of h.
Next we defined light-cones in BST models, and to guarantee that they have
properties similar to those of light-cones of space-times of physics, we assumed four
natural postulates C1–C4 on branching histories. We proved that light-cones are
history-independent, which provides evidence that our definitions properly gener-
alize the concept of light-cones from a single space-time to a modal context of many
branching histories. We showed that provided we rule out certain pathological
models by the addition of conditions C1–C4 to the postulates of BST, the set of
‘‘borderless diamonds’’ serves as a base for the topology TðhÞ (Theorem 28).
With these materials in hand, we turned to our first question: Do BST histories
have the Hausdorff property? The most important result of this investigation is that
the answer turns positive when we ask if the four conditions C1–C4 suffice for the
Hausdorff property for individual BST histories (Theorem 35). Since in our many-
branching-histories representation of indeterminism, each BST history was intended
to play the role of a spacetime, and since most spacetime theorists believe that a
topological understanding of spacetime cries out for the Hausdorff property,
Theorem 35, with its intricate proof, was welcome indeed.
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Turning to our central question of what regions of chanciness look like, we
limited our attention to the study of the Hausdorff property in the world of
branching histories. Our main results, Theorems 42 and 47, relate the satisfaction of
the Hausdorff property in a BST model to the existence of passive indeterminism in
the model. Theorem 42 tells us that the failure of the Hausdorff property is a
necessary condition of passive indeterminism. Theorem 47 tidies up our field of
concepts by showing that given the conditions C1–C4, the implication can be
strengthened to an equivalence: Passive indeterminism and the failure of the
Hausdorff property stand or fall together. One should infer that whereas the
Hausdorff property rightly seems essential for any reasonable theory of spacetime,
on the other hand, it seems totally out of place for a world consisting of a family of
branching spacetimes.
The equivalence of a failure of the Hausdorff property and passive indeterminism
prompted our final question: Just how ubiquitous is passive indeterminism? The
answer is given by our Lemma 43: Excluding some pathology, an indeterministic
BST model (i.e., a model with choice points) exhibits passive indeterminism.
We read these results as optimistic, especially for a future project of merging
branching space-times with general relativity. Given physically realistic conditions
C1–C4, each history (or space-time) has the Hausdorff property, which is physically
important. Whether this property is satisfied by a whole model of branching
histories is neutral to current physics. One may thus attempt to associate a
differential structure to a BST model in such a way that each history be a time-
oriented manifold satisfying the Hausdorff property.21
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